Optimal Fiscal Policy with Consumption Taxation by Motta, Giorgio Enrico & Rossi, Raffaele
Optimal Fiscal Policy with Consumption
Taxation∗
Giorgio Motta† Raffaele Rossi‡
April 2018
JEL classification: E62, H21.
Keywords: fiscal policy, consumption taxation, endogenous government spending.
∗We are grateful to the Editor (Kenneth D. West) and three anonymous referees as well as to Emanuele
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We characterise optimal fiscal policies in a General Equilibrium model with monopo-
listic competition and endogenous public spending. The government can tax consump-
tion, as alternative to labour income taxes. Consumption taxation acts as indirect
taxation of profits (intratemporal gains of taxing consumption) and enables the policy-
maker to manage the burden of public debt more efficiently (intertemporal gains of
taxing consumption). We show analytically that these two gains imply that the op-
timal share of government spending is higher under consumption taxation than with
labour income taxation. Then, we quantify numerically each of these gains by calibrat-
ing the model on the US economy.
2
1 Introduction
In the past five decades most OECD countries have shifted their tax burden from income
to consumption, mainly in the form of Value Added Tax.1 Since 1965, in these countries
the share of consumption taxes as a percentage of GDP has more than doubled, from 3.2
percent to 6.9 percent in 2013. At the moment they raise more than 20 percent of total
tax revenues on average, compared with 11.9 percent in 1965, (see OECD, 2014). For this
reason, understanding the effects and relative merits of consumption taxation is crucial for
the setting of economic policy and its role in pursuing fiscal stability, efficiency and welfare.
Along this line, this paper analyses both analytically and numerically the efficiency gains
from taxing consumption by studying optimal fiscal policies in the vein of Ramsey (1927) (see
also Lucas & Stokey, 1983) in a tractable and deterministic Dynamic General Equilibrium
model that abstracts from capital accumulation, where firms have monopolistic power, public
spending directly increases households’ utility and the government balances its budget by
levying distortionary linear labour income and consumption taxes (but no lump-sum taxes)
and by issuing risk-less bonds. Compared to a scenario where only labour income taxes
are available, we identify and quantify two distinct benefits of taxing consumption and we
map how these two benefits translates on the optimal provision of public spending and on
households’ welfare.
The first benefit is that consumption taxation serves as indirect taxation of inefficient
profits, that otherwise would go untaxed under labour income taxation. We call this the
intratemporal gains of taxing consumption. These intratemporal gains reduce the allocative
inefficiency of monopolistic competition and disappear under perfect competition. The sec-
ond benefit consists in consumption taxes acting as indirect taxation of the economy’s initial
level of the wealth, which is inelastically supplied and therefore can be taxed without dis-
torting the economy. Given that wealth is entirely held under the form of government bonds,
this one-time consumption tax in the initial period reduces debt and its burden in the long-
run and in turn, compared with labour income taxation, also reduces the time inconsistency
problem featured in Ramsey policy-making. We call this the intertemporal gains of taxing
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consumption. These intertemporal gains grow with the initial level of wealth (debt) and
vanish when the initial level of wealth (debt) is zero. We prove analytically that due to these
two efficiency gains, the optimal share of government spending is higher under consumption
taxes than under labour income taxes. Finally, in a numerical exercise aimed to replicate
some salient features of the US economy, we find that both the intratemporal and the in-
tertemporal gains from taxing consumption are quantitatively important for the households’
welfare. These gains hold under some important extensions of the baseline model, such
as non-separability between leisure and consumption and complementarity-substitutability
between private and public spending.
This paper links to the existing literature in two important ways. First, it contributes
to the public finance literature that studies the welfare gains of taxing consumption, see
Auerbach et al. (1983), Jones et al. (1993), Altig et al. (2001) and Trabandt & Uhlig
(2011) amongst others. On this, our closest contribution can be found in Coleman (2000),
who finds, in a deterministic model with capital accumulation and perfect competition,
that replacing income taxes with consumption taxes would lead to large welfare gains in the
United States. Correia (2010) extends this result to a heterogeneous-agents framework. Two
recent contributions highlight the role of consumption taxation as a tool to relax a constraint
of the monetary authority on the nominal interest rate, either as a result of the zero lower
bound (Correia et al. , 2013) or in a monetary union (Farhi et al. , 2014). However none of
these contributions highlights and quantifies the interactions of consumption taxation with
the market structure of the economy, public debt and government spending.
Second, we contribute to the literature, pioneered by Samuelson (1954), on the opti-
mal provision of public goods. On this theme, Adam (2011) analyses optimal government
spending in a New Keynesian model with labour income taxation and finds that public-
spending-to-income ratio falls short of its first best level. Klein et al. (2008) study the
provision of public spending in a Real Business Cycle model with labour income taxation
when the policy-maker may or may not be able to commit to future policies. They find that
the optimal share of public-spending-to-income is higher under commitment. Michaillat &
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Saez (2015) find in a Real Business Cycle model with frictional unemployment that opti-
mal government spending should exceed its first best level in order to reduce unemployment.
Compared to this literature, we extend the theory of optimal public expenditure by studying
the role of consumption taxation in shaping the provision of public good.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 presents the
policy analysis. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
We present a discrete time, flexible price economy, with linear technology in labour, without
uncertainty nor capital accumulation, where firms have monopolistic power. The benevolent
government finances an endogenously determined level of government spending, gt, through
a proportional labour income tax, τht ∈ (−∞, 1), a linear consumption tax, τ ct ∈ (−1,∞),
and by issuing a one-period discount bond, bt+1. Its budget constraint is
gt + bt = τ
c
t ct + τ
h
t wtht + p
b
tbt+1, (1)
where ct is private consumption, wt are real wages, ht represents labour supply and p
b
t is the
ex-ante real bond price. We consider two versions of the model: The first version allows only
for labour income taxation and debt, while the second version allows only for consumption
taxation and debt. In this way we can fully disentangle the relative merits and inefficiencies
associated with each tax instrument. While we describe the model with all of these fiscal
instruments, it should be understood that a subset of them are set to zero in any version of
the model.
The representative household takes prices and policies as given, chooses consumption,
savings via public bond holding, bt+1, and leisure `t, with the standard time constraint,





βtu (ct, `t, gt), (2)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. The utility function in (2) is separable across
time, twice continuously differentiable, with a constant Frisch elasticity of labour supply.
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Furthermore we assume that utility is increasing in its three arguments, that is uc,t > 0,
u`,t > 0 and ug,t > 0, concave, i.e. ucc,t < 0, u``,t < 0 and ugg,t < 0, and that allows
for non-separability between leisure and consumption and complementarity/substitutability
between private and public spending. We indicate respectively with ux,t and uxx,t the first
and the second partial derivatives of ut with respect to the generic variable x at time t.
Consistently with these properties, we specify the per-period utility function as,







1−σ , for σ 6= 1,
α log(ct) + (1− α) log(gt)− κ (1− `t)1+1/ϕ , for σ = 1,
(3)
where α ∈ [0, 1] represents the relative utility weight on private consumption, ϕ is the
(constant) Frisch elasticity of labour supply, κ is the utility weight of leisure and σ is the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) and the relative risk aversion parameter. From
(3) it follows that ucg is < ( >, = ) 0 if and only if σ is > ( <, = ) 1.
2 The latter condition
means that when the current-period utility function u(.) exhibits strong (weak) curvature, c
and g are Edgeworth substitutes (complements), see Ni (1995).
Both private and public consumption baskets consist of constant-elasticity of substitution



















ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution. The household’s budget constraint can be written as
(1 + τ ct ) ct + p
b




+ bt + dt, ∀t, (4)
where dt are the aggregate profits rebated from the monopolistic competitive producers. The
















1 + τ ct+1
) , ∀t. (6)
Examining the household’s first-order conditions, the different distortions caused by the
two tax instruments become apparent. The labour income tax distorts the (intratemporal)
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consumption-leisure margin, (5). The current consumption tax distorts the same margin.
In addition, both the current and next period’s consumption tax enter into the current
(forward-looking) Euler equation, (6).
We now present the supply side of the economy. Each of the differentiated goods i ∈
[0, 1] is produced by one monopolistic firm who employs labour using a linear production
technology yi,t = hi,t, where yi,t is the output of the generic firm i. Via standard optimality
conditions, one can show that the marginal costs for firm i are simply equal to the real
wages wt. Monopolistic competition implies that firms can charge a price higher than their
marginal costs. Normalising prices to 1, this implies µiwt = 1, where µi =
ε
ε−1 ≥ 1 represents
the (time-invariant) mark-up of firms i over their marginal costs. Finally, firm’s i profits are
equal to di,t = (1− wt) yi,t = 1εyi,t. Note that under perfect competition (ε→∞) profits will
be zero. We concentrate on symmetric equilibrium. Thus the following aggregations hold
for any i, 1) hi,t = ht; 2) yi,t = yt; 3) µi,t = µt; and 4) di,t = dt. We are now ready to provide
a formal definition of the decentralised equilibrium.














, and private sector allocations, {ct, `t, ht, yt, dt}∞t=1,
satisfying, the government’s budget constraint, (1); the private sector optimisation taking
government policies and prices as given, that is, the household’s time constraint, `t +ht = 1,
the household’s budget constraint, (4), and optimality conditions, (5), (6); the market clearing
condition, ct + gt = yt; the transversality condition limT→∞ β
T uc,T
1+τcT









= 0, taking the initial level of debt b0 as given.
3 Ramsey Policy
Our policy exercise starts by defining the efficient allocation of the model.
Definition 2 (First Best). The Social Planner’s Program defines the first-best allocation.
This consists of allocations {gt, ct, `t, ht, yt}∞t=0 that maximise (2) subject to the household’s
7
time constraint, 1 = ht + `t, the production function, yt = ht, and the market clearing
condition, ct + gt = yt.






Proof. The proof is straightforward. First let us substitute the production function into
the market clearing condition to eliminate yt and have a single constraint to the maximisa-
tion problem. Then by taking the first order conditions and combining them through the
Lagrangian multiplier, we obtain (7).
A variable with the superfix sp indicates its level in the Social Planner (or first-best)
allocation. Consistent with the seminal theory of optimal public expenditure presented in
Samuelson (1954), in the first-best equilibrium the marginal utilities of private and public
consumption must equate the marginal utility of leisure. This simple allocation rule is
optimal because it is equally costly to produce public and private consumption goods.3
Definition 3 (Ramsey Problem). The Ramsey policy-maker maximises (2) over the decen-
tralised equilibria. A Ramsey outcome is a decentralised allocation that attains the maximum
of (2).
Compared to the Social Planner, the Ramsey Planner faces three inefficiencies. First,
the Planner has to balance its budget by using distortive taxation, which means that the
government has to sacrifice resources in order to finance its expenditure. Second, the presence
of monopolistic competition creates, via the real wages, an inefficient wedge between the
marginal utility of leisure and the marginal utility of consumption. This generates a shortage
in the supply of labour. Third, the Planner has to deal with the burden of a positive level
of debt, which increases the government financing needs, further deteriorates resources and
creates a time inconsistency problem. Our exercise aims to study how the Ramsey policy-
maker trades off these inefficiencies in order to maximise welfare.
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We will now present the policy problems for different fiscal financing schemes, i.e. labour
income vs. consumption taxation. Following the literature, e.g. Lucas & Stokey (1983), we
adopt a primal approach, meaning that we express the policy problems in terms of allocations
rather than tax rates.
Labour Income Taxation. In the model with solely labour income taxes, i.e. τ ct = 0 ∀t,
for a given initial level of debt (b0), the Ramsey Planner maximises equation (2), subject to
the aggregate feasibility constraint (1− `t = ct + gt) and the implementability constraint4
uc,tct + βuc,t+1bt+1 = u`,t (1− `t) + uc,tbt +
1
ε
uc,t (1− `t) ,∀t = 0, 1, 2, .... (8)
Taking derivatives to the associated Lagrangian problem, the optimality conditions are



























− (γt − γt−1)ucc,tbt − γtu`c,t (1− `t) = λt, (10)
ug,t + γt
[




+ γt−1ucg,tbt = λt, (11)
γt+1 = γt, γ−1 = 0, (12)
where λt ≥ 0 and γt ≥ 0 denote the Lagrangian multipliers attached to the feasibility and
the implementability constraints, respectively.
Consumption Taxation. Similar to the previous case, with consumption taxes, i.e. τht = 0
∀t, for a given initial level of debt (b0), the Ramsey Planner maximises equation (2), subject




ct + βu`,t+1bt+1 = u`,t (1− `t) + u`,tbt. (13)












(ucc,tct + uc,t)− (γt − γt−1)u`c,tbt − γtu`c,t (1− `t) = λt (16)
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γt+1 = γt γ−1 = 0 (17)
Importantly, (12) and (17) imply that γt must be constant ∀t ≥ 1. As presented in Lucas
& Stokey (1983), in this class of models the steady-state level of debt is not determined.
Given that in the equilibrium γt must be constant, all the remaining conditions are identical
∀t ≥ 1, and so do the values of c, g, `, and b. Thus, the steady-state allocations depend on
γ. Equations (10) and (16) evaluated at time 0 show that γ depends on the initial level of
debt, b0. Hence the steady-state of the Ramsey Problem(s) depends on initial conditions.
However, under the two different tax instruments, the Ramsey Planner faces different
implementability constraints, i.e. (8) versus (13). This implies that, given the same initial
level of public debt b0, and the structural parameters of the economy, the allocations along
the transition and in turn the welfare properties of the two policy scenarios will be in general
different. The aim of this policy exercise is to explore these differences.
3.1 Analytical Results
We study a version of the model where the instantaneous utility is separable in its three
arguments, i.e. σ = 1, see equation (3). In this case, all cross derivatives are equal to zero,







; ucc = −
α
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This model restriction is instructive as it helps to develop transparent economic intuitions
through a set of analytical insights. In turn, these insights will allow us to disentangle the
effects of each inefficiency (distortionary taxation, monopolistic competition and government
debt) faced by the Ramsey Planner on the optimal allocations under the two fiscal financing
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schemes. We first analyse the case where the government has access only to labour income
taxes.
Proposition 2 (Optimal Policy with Labour Income Taxation). Under labour income tax-
ation, given a generic positive level of initial outstanding debt, b0, and the conditions on





















































, t = 1, 2, ...
(20)
Proof. See Appendix.
We begin the explanation of Proposition 2 by considering the simplest case of the model
with labour income taxation, where debt is zero (bt = 0 ∀t, so that αγc20 b0 = 0) and there








= 0 ∀t), i.e. where the








≥ 1, between the marginal utility of government spending
and the marginal utility of leisure, as labour supply and total production are reduced by
distortionary taxation below their efficient levels. Second, the Ramsey allocation becomes
time-invariant, i.e. the absence of public debt eliminates the time inconsistency problem of
the government. As a result, equation (20) has the same elements at time 0 and for all
subsequent periods. Third, equation (20) shows that the optimal steady-state ratio of public





even though labour supply is distorted by income taxation. It should be noted that this
latter result does not hold in general and depends, in particular, on the utility function
where the substitution and the income effects of government spending on labour supply
cancel each other out. The utility function we have chosen is particularly instructive, as it
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produces the first-best choice of public to private consumption, if there are tax distortions
but no monopolistic competition nor public debt. This allows to show how the introduction
of these two inefficiencies changes the optimal provision of public goods.
We now add monopolistic competition (ε < ∞) to the previous case. First, this creates





a further decrease in the total production, as prices now exceed marginal costs. Second, the
presence of monopolistic competition introduces a new wedge between marginal utility of
public and private consumption, see equation (20). This is because the inefficiency repre-
sented by untaxed profits makes, other things equal, the substitution effect of government
spending on labour supply stronger than its income effect. As a result, the Ramsey planner









> 0, thus lowering taxation and in turn shrinking the inefficient
wedge between consumption and leisure.
Finally, we consider a situation with perfect competition (ε → ∞) and positive initial
level of public debt (b0 > 0). The presence of public debt introduces a time inconsistency
problem in the Ramsey allocation, whose strength depends on the initial level of outstanding
debt, i.e. αγ
c20
b0. As a result, equation (20) is different at time 0 and in any subsequent period.
This is due to the Planner’s incentive to manipulate the bond price on the initial level of
debt. In a generic period t ≥ 1, current consumption influences both bond prices at time
t and at t − 1. As a consequence, if the government uses taxes and public expenditure to
increase the price of the bond at time t, other things equal, the bond price at time t − 1
decreases. Instead at t = 0 consumers’ savings and previous bond price are given. Therefore,
if the government inherits a positive level of debt, it can benefit from an increase in the price
of the bond at time 0 without incurring any additional cost. Equation (20) shows that this
is implemented by increasing the ratio of private to public consumption at time 0 above its




, where the increase is proportional to the initial level of public
debt, b0. This policy implies lower initial taxes and higher demand for saving, thus allowing
the government to sell its bonds at a more convenient price.
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We now turn our attention to the case where only consumption taxation is available to
the Ramsey Planner.
Proposition 3 (Optimal Policy with Consumption Taxation). Under consumption taxa-
tion, given a generic positive level of initial outstanding debt b0 and the conditions on the



















































∀t ≥ 0. (22)
Proof. See Appendix.
With perfect competition and no public debt, the optimal allocation under consumption
taxation mimics the one under labour income taxation, as the two policy problems are equiv-
alent.5 Therefore the description presented above applies here, mutatis mutandis. Things
start being different if we consider a model with monopolistic competition and no public
debt. Under consumption taxation, this inefficiency affects the allocation only through the
implementability constraint in (13) (via an increase in γ), but it does not alter the wedge
between public and private consumption, which stays at the efficient level independently
of ε, see equation (22) . This result is driven by the fact that any change in monopolistic
power is absorbed by consumption taxation, which acts as indirect taxation of (inefficient)
profits. We call this property the intratemporal gain of consumption taxation and note that
this effect is absent under labour income taxation. This efficiency gain, combined with the
specification of the utility function, guarantees that for any change in consumption tax rate,
triggered for instance by higher monopolistic power, the substitution and income effect of
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labour supply are of the same magnitude, thus leaving the ratio between private and public
consumption constant at its first-best level.
Finally, also in the case of perfect competition and initial public debt, the Ramsey Plan-
ner keeps the ratio of public to private consumption at the first-best level, independently of
b0. This is because consumption taxation acts as a one-time, indirect taxation of the initial
wealth (represented here by debt) that is inelastically supplied and therefore can be taxed
without distorting the economy. The Planner uses this feature by increasing taxes at t = 0,
thus reducing the burden of public debt for any t ≥ 1. As a result, the time inconsistency
problem is less severe compared to the labour income tax case, and so is the incentive to
manipulate the initial bond price and the ratio between private and public consumption.
We label this property the intertemporal gain of consumption taxation. As for the intratem-
poral gain, the specification of the utility function guarantees that for any initial change in
consumption tax rate, due to higher b0, the substitution and income effect of labour supply
are of the same magnitude, thus leaving the ratio between private and public consumption
constant at its efficient level. However, due to higher taxes in t = 0, this policy comes at
the cost of a decrease in efficiency in the first period. From an analytical point of view, this







1/ϕ−1 b0 in (21) and increases
in the initial level of debt.
Summing up, two main results emerge from this Section. First, the two fiscal financing
schemes lead to fundamental differences in the dynamics of allocations and prices. Second,
the intratemporal and intertemporal efficiency gains of taxing consumption imply that the
optimal size of government spending is higher under consumption taxes than under labour
income taxes.
3.2 Quantitative Analysis
We now turn to numerical methods in order to solve for the optimal fiscal policy mix under
the two fiscal scenarios, i.e. consumption and labour income taxation. We will also quantify
the intratemporal and intertemporal welfare gains from taxing consumption. In order to do
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so, we solve a calibrated version of our economy. In what follows we specify the benchmark
calibration of the model as well as some alternative parametrisations. To this end, we need
to make some further assumptions up front.
The model is calibrated at annual frequency on US data over the period 1995-2010. Data
are collected from Trabandt & Uhlig (2011). We set the discount factor, β, to 0.973. This
value implies an average annual bond prices of 2.79 percent, consistent with US data for the
period under consideration. For the benchmark case, we set σ equal to 1 so that the utility is
separable in its three arguments. In this way we can give a precise quantitative assessment of
the analytical results discussed in Section 3.1. We then allow non-separability between public
and private consumption by setting σ either to 0.5 (Edgeworth complementarity between g
and c) or to 2 (Edgeworth substitutability between g and c).
We calibrate the relative utility weight on private consumption, α, such that, given the
other parameters, the first-best government-spending-to-income ratio is 16.1 percent. This
value implies that in the benchmark Ramsey steady state with labour income tax the ratio
of government spending to GDP is 15.5 percent. This is consistent with the US data for
the period under consideration. It is important to note that the Cobb-Douglas specification
between private and public consumption implies that α pins down uniquely the expenditure
shares in the first-best.
We set the elasticity of substitution among good varieties, ε, to 6.4, which implies a
price mark-up of around 15.6 percent. This value is consistent both with early empirical
estimates, e.g. Rotemberg & Woodford (1998), as well as more recent ones, e.g. Epifani &
Gancia (2011) and it lies within standard parametrisation adopted in the macroeconomic
literature, see inter alia Kryvtsov & Midrigan (2013). Given the importance of this parameter
in shaping the optimal provision of public goods under the two financing scenarios, we allow
this elasticity to vary between 5 and ∞, that correspond to a high mark-up (ε = 5) and to
the perfect competition (ε =∞) cases.
In our benchmark case we fix the initial level of public debt, b0, so that the share of
debt-to-GDP is as in the US over the period of study, i.e. b0/y0 = γb = 0.64. We then solve
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for the optimal allocation for different values of debt-to-GDP ratios.
Finally, for the benchmark case of σ = 1, we set the Frisch elasticity of labour supply
equal to 1, a value consistent with the survey evidence of Kimball & Shapiro (2008). The
micro and macro literature tend to differ on the estimates of the Frisch elasticity. For this
reason we also control the quantitative implications of our policy exercise with a wide range of
values of ϕ. For consistency, we calibrate κ such that, given the other structural parameters,
households work 27.5 percent of their time endowment in the first best equilibrium. This
value implies that in the benchmark Ramsey steady state with labour income tax, households
work 25 percent of their time, a value consistent with the average labour supply found in
the US data for our sample. The complete description of the parametrisation adopted is
reported in Table 1.
As explained in Section 3, the Ramsey problem can be recast as a two-period problem,
at t = 0 and at t ≥ 1, imposing the extra condition that γ−1 = 0. By doing so, one can find
the solution to the Ramsey allocation solving a system of non-linear equations and time 0
and for any t ≥ 1, given the initial level of debt, b0.
Table 2 reports the allocations and welfare under the benchmark calibration for the cases
of labour income tax and consumption tax, as well as the efficient allocation. As explained
in the analytical Section, under labour income taxes, the incentive to manipulate bonds
prices translates into a decrease in the initial public spending-income ratio, which is set 2
percentage points below its long run level, and a consequent reduction in the initial level of
taxes, set as low as 6.1 percent. This policy fosters the demand for saving, and allows the
government to sell its bonds at a more convenient price in the first period, i.e. pb0 = 1.071.
At the same time, lower taxes in the initial period push households to postpone leisure. As
a result, income in the initial period is around 2 percentage points above its long run level.
Finally and consistent with Proposition 2, the combination of monopolistic competition and
initial public debt implies that the government-spending-to-income ratio is below its first
best counterpart along the entire transition path.
Under consumption taxation the incentive to manipulate the initial bond prices is lower,
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as the Ramsey planner can indirectly tax the initial level of wealth via increasing taxes in the
initial period. This policy reduces debt and debt-to-income ratio for any t ≥ 1, thus lowering
the need of fiscal revenues in the long run. Since the long-run debt is smaller, the time
inconsistency problem under consumption taxation is less severe than under labour income
taxation. Higher taxes in the initial period create an incentive to postpone labour supply
and consumption. As a result, income is lower in t = 0 than in the subsequent periods. As
shown analytically in Proposition 3, under consumption taxation the government-spending-
to-income ratio is at its efficient level for the entire transition path.
The policy differences between the two fiscal financing schemes imply substantial welfare
gains from taxing consumption. It is interesting to note that these gains come both from
the role that consumption taxation has in indirectly taxing profits, (intratemporal gains
from taxing consumption) and from the dynamic properties of consumption taxation which
allows to reduce debt in the long run (intertemporal gains from taxing consumption). In
our benchmark calibration, despite the fact that the consumption tax base is smaller than
the labour income tax base, taxing consumption rather than labour income can reduce our
measure of welfare loss by 20.45 percent.6
In Table 3 we solve the model with different degrees of monopolistic competition.7 In
order to do so we vary the parameter ε. For the high monopolistic case we set ε = 5, a value
that implies a mark-up of 25%. This elasticity is higher than the estimates reported in IO
studies, around 3, but lower than elasticities that are consistent with estimates of mark-up
from production function estimates, around 10, see Kryvtsov & Midrigan (2013). Then we
solve the model under perfect competition, i.e. ε→∞. This exercise is particularly instruc-
tive as it allows to gather a better quantitative insight about the welfare gains of taxing
consumption, i.e. intratemporal vs. intertemporal gains. This is because the role of con-
sumption taxes as indirect taxation of profits disappears under perfect competition. Hence
the resulting welfare gains of taxing consumption are generated only by the intertemporal
dimension. In our parametrisation, the intertemporal gains of taxing consumption amount
to 9.1 percent. Differently, when monopolistic power is high, i.e. ε = 5, the role of con-
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sumption taxation as an indirect taxation of profits magnifies. Hence the welfare gains from
taxing consumption increases with respect to the benchmark calibration and amount to 22
percent. Moreover it is interesting to see that under labour income tax the share of govern-
ment spending to total output in the initial period decreases respect to the benchmark case.
As explained in Section 3.1, this is due to the negative substitution effect on labour supply
generated by the increase in monopolistic competition which pushes the Ramsey planner to
reduce public spending.
Table 4 presents the results from solving the model for different initial levels of public
debt. By varying b0 and keeping the monopolistic competition at its benchmark value, we
can control and in turn shut down the intertemporal gains of taxing consumption. In the
limiting case with no initial debt, the Ramsey problem reduces to a static maximisation
problem. This case is presented in the top quadrant of Table 4. Here the gains from taxing
consumption are solely given by its role in indirectly taxing profits, i.e. intratemporal gains
from taxing consumption, and amount to 17.9 percent. While both the intertemporal and
the intratemporal gains from taxing consumption are sizeable, the intratemporal gains are
quantitatively more important.
In the second part of Table 4 we increase the initial debt equal to 120 percent of GDP,
a value that is almost twice as big as in the benchmark calibration. The results follow
consistently as expected. Compared to the benchmark, under both tax scenarios, the Ramsey
Planner suffers greater welfare losses and has a stronger incentive to manipulate the initial
bond price pb0. Moreover, as describe in Proposition 2, under labour income taxation, the
higher need for fiscal revenues reinforce the substitution effect of labour supply. Compared to
the benchmark case, this pushes the Ramsey planner to lower the government-spending-to-
income-ratio along the entire transition path. In this case, the gains from taxing consumption
amount to around 22.4 percent.
Table 5 presents the results from varying the Frisch elasticity of labour supply. We solve
the model with two values that are somehow at the extremes of the available estimates of the
elasticity of labour supply. In particular, we consider (i) ϕ = 0.2, which is in line with recent
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micro estimates such as Domeij & Floden (2006) (see also Guner et al. , 2012), and (ii) ϕ = 5
as a high value, which is sometimes chosen to better match the intertemporal variation of
aggregate hours (e.g. Gaĺı et al. , 2007). We adjust κ appropriately in each case as described
for the benchmark parametrisation. When the Frisch elasticity is low, i.e. ϕ = 0.5, the
substitution effect of labour supply is reduced. Thus the policy-maker can sustain the same
level of public expenditure and debt at a lower welfare cost. Under labour income tax this
implies that the Ramsey Planner can afford to push the public spending-income ratio closer
to the first best level without distorting excessively the economy. Of course this result is
reversed when the Frisch elasticity of high i.e. ϕ = 5 as the substitution effect of labour
supply gets bigger. As in the case of labour income taxation, under consumption taxation,
the economy is facing higher welfare losses when the Frisch elasticity is high compared to
when is low. The gains from taxing consumption decrease slightly as the Frisch elasticity
increases, passing from 20.7 percent (ϕ = 0.5) to 20 percent (ϕ = 5).
Table 6 presents the allocation and welfare under the alternative parametrisation where
σ 6= 1. As for the previous case, we re-calibrate κ so that in the efficient allocation
`sp = 0.725. We keep all the remaining parameters at their benchmark values. The pa-
rameter σ controls both the Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution (EIS) and the com-
plementarity/substitutability between private and public consumption. Therefore in setting
this parameter we follow the literature that estimates the EIS as well as the evidence pre-
sented in Ni (1995). There is not a unanimous consensus on the EIS. To this end, we solve
the model with σ = 2, which is consistent with low values of EIS as typically found by
the micro literature, see among others Blundell et al. (1994). This value also implies that
private and public consumption are Edgeworth substitutes.8 We also solve the model with
σ = 0.5, a number consistent with some macro-finance literature that finds high EIS, see
among others Bansal & Yaron (2004). This value implies that private and public consump-
tion are Edgeworth complements. Given this parametrisation, the utility function is not
longer separable in its three elements, meaning that labour supply decisions directly affect
the marginal utility of private and public consumption, and vice versa.
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Despite this, the main message from this experiment is similar both qualitatively and
quantitatively to the benchmark case. However there are some noticeable differences. We
start describing the situation with labour income taxes, low EIS and gross substitutability
between private and public consumption, i.e. σ = 2. On the one hand, with low EIS, it is
harder for the Planner to redistribute private consumption intertemporally. Compared to
the benchmark case, this effect pushes the policy-maker to reduce even further taxation in
the initial period and sell bonds at a more favourable price, i.e. pb0 is bigger when σ = 2
than in the benchmark case. On the other hand, substitutability between private and public
consumption, i.e. ucg < 0, implies that the planner can decrease strategically government
spending in the initial period in order to sustain a higher level of consumption. However,
from our numerical simulation, it appears that this latter effect is weaker than the EIS
channel.
Differently, under consumption taxation the Ramsey planner has a weaker incentive to
manipulate the initial bond prices compared with the benchmark case. This is because
the policy-maker can now influence directly the Euler equation via a dynamic pattern of
consumption taxes in period zero and in subsequent periods. As a result, the increase in
taxes in the initial period and the subsequent effect on bond prices are less dramatic than
the benchmark case.
As in the the case with separable preferences, under consumption taxation, the Ramsey
planner sets the share of government spending as in the first-best allocation, while under
labour income taxes, the optimal share of government spending falls short of its first-best
counterpart along the entire transition path.9 The intuition for this result follows directly
from the the case analysed in Section 3.1 and we therefore remind the reader to the discussion
presented there. All in all, under both fiscal scenarios the welfare losses are higher than in
the benchmark case. This is mainly due to the higher level of long-run public debt. In this
case, the gains from taxing consumption amount to 20 percent.
Consistently, all these results are reversed when the model is solved with a high EIS
and gross complementarity between private and public consumption, i.e. σ = 0.5. Under
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both fiscal scenarios, the long run level of public debt is lower than in the benchmark case,
leading to smaller welfare losses. The welfare gains from taxing consumption amount to 21.9
percent.
4 Concluding Remarks
Consumption taxation has been widely used by governments around the globe as a source
of fiscal revenues. For example, as of July 2017, the value-added tax on standard items
ranges from 17 (Luxembourg) to 27 (Hungary) percent in European Union countries. At
the same time, government spending as a share of GDP has raised substantially to respond
to an increasing need for social insurance spending on health care and retirement. In this
paper we study the properties and relative merits of consumption taxation and its role
in sustaining public spending by considering a simple economy characterised by infinitely
lived representative households with love for public goods, a perfect competitive labour
market and a monopolistic competitive goods market. In this general environment, our
analysis shows that taxing consumption, compared to taxing labour income, allows the
policy-maker to sustain both higher public spending and higher aggregate welfare. We are
able to disentangle two effects through which consumption taxation overtake income taxes.
First, consumption taxation serves as an indirect taxation of the inefficient profits produced
by the non competitive good markets. This beneficial effect reduces the inefficient allocation
of firms’ market power and disappears under perfect competition. Second, consumption
taxation acts as indirect taxation on the initial level of wealth, that is inelastically supplied,
and can therefore be taxed without distorting the economy. Given that all wealth is held
through public debt bonds, this one-time consumption tax reduces public debt in the long
run and in turn the time-inconsistency problem of Ramsey policy making. In an economy
calibrated to replicate some salient features of the US economy, we find that both effects are
quantitatively important for households’ welfare.
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A PROOFS
A.1 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2




= λt, ∀t. (A.1)































,∀t ≥ 0. (A.2)

























, ∀t ≥ 0.
While the FOC wrt private consumption is different at time 0 and at any future period, i.e.
α
c0



























































, for t ≥ 1. (A.5)
QED.
A.2 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
For the case of consumption taxation, the FOC wrt to government spending collapses to
1− α
gt
= λt, ∀t ≥ 0.
















,∀t ≥ 0. (A.6)






, ∀t ≥ 0. (A.7)
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(A.8)






















































, for t ≥ 1. (A.10)
QED
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1The most notable exception is represented by the US, although most states within the US employ some
form of retail sales tax. Moreover, there have been repeated attempts to introduce a Federal Consumption
Tax. For example, in January 2005, the US President George W. Bush commissioned a panel to propose a
comprehensive reform to the tax code (President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, 2005, available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/taxreformpanel/index-2.html). The proposal consisted in replacing
the entire income-tax system with a national sales tax. However, the disagreement among panel members
regarding the effects of such a reform inhibited its adoption.
2We indicate with uxy,t the cross derivative of the generic variables x and y at time t.
3Given that we consider homothetic preferences, the formula in (7) determines a unique efficient ratio
of public-to-private consumption, gsp/csp. As gy ≡
g/c
g/c+1 , equation (7) also defines a unique government
purchases-output ratio, denoted by gsp/ysp.
4The implementability constraint (8) is obtained by substituting into (4) taxes and real wages via (5)
and bond prices via (6) and then imposing τ ct = 0.
5In this case, equations (8), (19) and (20) are equivalent to (13), (21) and (22), respectively.
















the allocation under the generic policy i. The last row in Table 2 reports the
percentage increase in consumption υ making the utility in the first best allocation equivalent to the alter-



















, where υht and υct are the consumption
equivalent welfare losses under labour income and consumption taxation, respectively.
7Along the robustness analysis, for brevity reasons, we use the log specification of the utility function. In
an Online Appendix available at this https://sites.google.com/site/raffaelerossiwebpage/Home/research,
we solve the model with several other combinations of parameters.
8Ni (1995) (Table 3, page 603) finds values of σ both above and below 1. The difference crucially depends
on the treatment of the underlying net-of-tax real interest rate.
9This can also be shown analytically. See the Online Appendix for a detailed derivation of the optimal
provision of public spending with non-separable preferences.
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Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Benchmark Alternative Description Restriction
β 0.973 - Discount Factor US Data (1995-2010)
σ 1 0.8-2 EIS-Edgeworth Parameter Literature
ϕ 1 0.2-5 Frisch Elasticity Literature
κ 6.612 Various Weight on Leisure US Data (1995-2010)
α 0.839 - Weight on Private Consumption US Data (1995-2010)
ε 6.4 5-∞ Elasticity of Substitution US Data (1995-2010)
γb 0.640 0-1.2 Debt-to-GDP Ratio US Data (1995-2010)
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Table 2: Tax Rates and Allocations, Benchmark Case
First Best Labour Income Tax Consumption Tax
Variable t = 0 t ≥ 1 t = 0 t ≥ 1
Consumption tax rate - 0 0 0.324 0.208
Labour income tax rate - 0.061 0.207 0 0
Hours worked, Income 0.275 0.241 0.224 0.219 0.230
Leisure 0.725 0.759 0.776 0.780 0.770
Consumption 0.231 0.233 0.211 0.184 0.193
Public spending 0.044 0.032 0.035 0.035 0.037
Public debt - 0.154 0.163 0.140 0.114
Public Debt Price - 1.071 0.973 1.019 0.973
Consumption-income ratio 0.839 0.865 0.845 0.839 0.839
Public spending-income ratio 0.161 0.135 0.155 0.161 0.161
Public debt-income ratio - 0.640 0.726 0.640 0.496
Welfare-eq. consumption loss 0 0.044 0.035
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Table 3: Tax Rates and Allocations, Monopolistic Power
First Best Labour Income Tax Consumption Tax
Variable t = 0 t ≥ 1 t = 0 t ≥ 1
ε→∞, κ = 6.612
Consumption tax rate - 0 0 0.278 0.210
Labour income tax rate - 0.112 0.180 0 0
Hours worked, Income 0.275 0.257 0.249 0.243 0.250
Leisure 0.725 0.742 0.751 0.757 0.750
Consumption 0.231 0.219 0.209 0.204 0.210
Government Spending 0.044 0.039 0.040 0.039 0.040
Public debt - 0.165 0.172 0.156 0.138
Public debt price - 1.018 0.973 0.999 0.973
Consumption-income ratio 0.839 0.849 0.839 0.839 0.839
Public spending-income ratio 0.161 0.151 0.161 0.161 0.161
Public debt-income ratio - 0.640 0.689 0.640 0.554
Welfare-eq. consumption loss 0 0.011 0.010
ε = 5, κ = 6.612
Consumption tax rate - 0 0 0.338 0.207
Labour income tax rate - 0.042 0.215 0 0
Hours worked, Income 0.275 0.236 0.217 0.213 0.224
Leisure 0.725 0.764 0.783 0.787 0.776
Consumption 0.231 0.206 0.184 0.178 0.188
Government Spending 0.044 0.030 0.033 0.034 0.036
Public debt - 0.151 0.160 0.136 0.107
Public debt price - 1.089 0.973 1.024 0.973
Consumption-income ratio 0.839 0.871 0.848 0.839 0.839
Public spending-income ratio 0.161 0.129 0.152 0.161 0.161
Public debt-income ratio - 0.640 0.736 0.640 0.480
Welfare-eq. consumption loss 0 0.059 0.046
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Table 4: Tax Rates and Allocations, Public Debt
First Best Labour Income Tax Consumption Tax
Variable t = 0 t ≥ 1 t = 0 t ≥ 1
γb = 0, κ = 6.612
Consumption tax rate - 0 0 0.192 0.192
Labour income tax rate - 0.184 0.184 0 0
Hours worked, Income 0.275 0.227 0.227 0.231 0.231
Leisure 0.725 0.773 0.773 0.769 0.769
Consumption 0.231 0.192 0.192 0.194 0.194
Government Spending 0.044 0.035 0.035 0.037 0.037
Public debt - 0 0 0 0
Public debt price - - - - -
Consumption-income ratio 0.839 0.845 0.845 0.839 0.839
Public spending-income ratio 0.161 0.155 0.155 0.161 0.161
Public debt-income ratio - 0 0 0 0
Welfare-eq. consumption loss 0 0.039 0.032
γb = 1.2, κ = 6.612
Consumption tax rate - 0 0 0.446 0.220
Labour income tax rate - -0.056 0.227 0 0
Hours worked, Income 0.275 0.253 0.221 0.210 0.229
Leisure 0.725 0.747 0.779 0.790 0.771
Consumption 0.231 0.223 0.187 0.176 0.192
Government Spending 0.044 0.030 0.034 0.034 0.037
Public debt - 0.304 0.298 0.252 0.196
Public debt price - 1.160 0.973 1.058 0.973
Consumption-income ratio 0.839 0.881 0.845 0.839 0.839
Public spending-income ratio 0.161 0.119 0.154 0.161 0.161
Public debt-income ratio - 1.200 1.348 1.200 0.856
Welfare-eq. consumption loss 0 0.049 0.038
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Table 5: Tax Rates and Allocations, Frisch Elasticity
First Best Labour Income Tax Consumption Tax
Variable t = 0 t ≥ 1 t = 0 t ≥ 1
ϕ = 0.5, κ = 16.028
Consumption tax rate - 0 0 0.361 0.207
Labour income tax rate - 0.110 0.208 0 0
Hours worked, Income 0.275 0.248 0.240 0.234 0.244
Leisure 0.725 0.752 0.760 0.765 0.756
Consumption 0.231 0.213 0.202 0.197 0.205
Government Spending 0.044 0.035 0.038 0.038 0.039
Public debt - 0.159 0.167 0.127 0.111
Public debt price - 1.023 0.973 1.054 0.973
Consumption-income ratio 0.839 0.858 0.843 0.839 0.839
Public spending-income ratio 0.161 0.142 0.157 0.161 0.161
Public debt-income ratio - 0.640 0.697 0.640 0.453
Welfare-eq. consumption loss 0 0.029 0.023
ϕ = 5, κ = 3.923
Consumption tax rate - 0 0 0.251 0.211
Labour income tax rate - -0.036 0.204 0 0
Hours worked, Income 0.275 0.237 0.195 0.198 0.203
Leisure 0.725 0.763 0.805 0.802 0.797
Consumption 0.231 0.208 0.166 0.166 0.171
Government Spending 0.044 0.029 0.029 0.032 0.033
Public debt - 0.151 0.154 0.127 0.120
Public debt price - 1.219 0.973 0.977 0.973
Consumption-income ratio 0.839 0.878 0.849 0.839 0.839
Public spending-income ratio 0.161 0.122 0.151 0.161 0.161
Public debt-income ratio - 0.640 0.787 0.640 0.589
Welfare-eq. consumption loss 0 0.075 0.060
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Table 6: Tax Rates and Allocations, Non-Separable Preferences
First Best Labour Income Tax Consumption Tax
Variable t = 0 t ≥ 1 t = 0 t ≥ 1
σ = 2, κ = 4.408
Consumption tax rate - 0 0 0.264 0.210
Labour income tax rate - -0.013 0.207 0 0
Hours worked, Income 0.275 0.244 0.212 0.213 0.219
Leisure 0.725 0.756 0.788 0.787 0.781
Consumption 0.231 0.212 0.180 0.179 0.184
Government Spending 0.060 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.035
Public debt - 0.156 0.163 0.136 0.126
Public debt price - 1.178 0.973 0.982 0.973
Consumption-income ratio 0.839 0.869 0.846 0.839 0.839
Public spending-income ratio 0.161 0.131 0.154 0.161 0.161
Public debt-income ratio - 0.640 0.766 0.640 0.575
Welfare-eq. consumption loss 0 0.055 0.044
σ = 0.5, κ = 8.815
Consumption tax rate - 0 0 0.350 0.207
Labour income tax rate - 0.117 0.208 0 0
Hours worked, Income 0.275 0.246 0.238 0.232 0.242
Leisure 0.725 0.754 0.762 0.768 0.758
Consumption 0.231 0.212 0.201 0.195 0.203
Government Spending 0.060 0.034 0.037 0.037 0.039
Public debt - 0.157 0.164 0.149 0.112
Public debt price - 1.021 0.973 1.051 0.973
Consumption-income ratio 0.839 0.861 0.844 0.839 0.839
Public spending-income ratio 0.161 0.139 0.156 0.161 0.161
Public debt-income ratio - 0.640 0.688 0.640 0.463
Welfare-eq. consumption loss 0 0.032 0.025
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